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ABSTRACT
Two quasi-experiments are used to estimate the impact of parental divorce on the adult
incomes and labour market behaviour of adolescents, as well as on their use of social
programs, and their marital/fertility behaviour. These involve the use of individuals
experiencing the death of a parent, and legislative changes to the Canadian divorce law in
1986. Parental loss by death is assumed to be exogenous; the experiences of children with a
bereaved background offering a benchmark to assess the endogeneity of parental loss through
divorce. Differences between individuals with divorced parents and those from intact and
bereaved families significantly overstate the impact of divorce across a broad range of
outcomes. When background characteristics are controlled for—most notably the income and
labour market activity of parents in the years leading up to the divorce—parental divorce
seems to influence the marital decisions of adolescents, but not their labour market outcomes.
Adolescents whose parents divorced tend to put off marriage, and once married suffer a
greater likelihood of marital instability, but their earnings and incomes are not on average
much different from others.
KEYWORDS: Intergenerational mobility; Divorce; Children; Quasi-Experimental Design.
JEL CODES  : J12, J62, C23
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the meetings of: the Society of Labor Economists held in
Boston US; the Canadian International Labour Network in Burlington, Ontario; the International Association for
Research in Income and Wealth in Cambridge UK; the Canadian Employment Research Forum in Ottawa; and to
departmental seminars at Statistics Canada, the University of Essex, and the University of  Toronto. I would like
to thank Thesia Garner, Jane Gentleman, Céline LeBourdais, John Myles, Gary Solon and Frances Woolley for
comments, while at the same time noting that the responsibility for the content of the paper is mine alone, and in
particular should not be attributed to Statistics Canada. Correspondence can be directed to
miles.corak@statcan.ca.DEATH AND DIVORCE:
THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
PARENTAL LOSS ON ADOLESCENTS
The relationship between familial background and the capacity of children to become self-
reliant adults is a central element in the appropriate design of policies ranging from income
distribution to family law. Yet we know surprising little about how intergenerational processes
work to determine the long-term attainments of children. In a sweeping review of the U.S.
literature Haveman and Wolfe (1995) point out that it is difficult to establish the causal
patterns at work because unobserved processes may jointly determine family structure and
children’s outcomes. This is particularly so in analyses dealing with the impact of parental
divorce on children. For example, McLanahan and Sandefur offer a thorough examination of
the topic, but begin by noting that it is very difficult to determine if children who grow up with
only one parent would have done better if their parents had not divorced  (1994, pp. 9-11). As
a result analysts are often forced to address a less demanding, and perhaps less meaningful
question: do children from divorced families do as well on average as children from intact
families with similar observable characteristics? In such a context it is easy to overstate the
impact of divorce, and in fact, Cherlin et al. (1991) using longitudinal surveys point out that “a
substantial portion of what is usually considered the effect of divorce on children is visible
before the parents separate” (p. 1386).
While there have been attempts to overcome difficulties associated with the
endogeneity of parental divorce by using instrumental variables and sibling information from
longitudinal surveys (Lang and Zagorsky 1999, Sandefur and Wells 1997), many observers2
may share the pessimistic view of McLanahan and Sandefur who state that “[w]ithout a
randomized experiment, we can never rule out the possibility that some other variable is
causing both family structure and children’s [outcomes]… Because of this analysts will
always disagree about whether family structure plays a causal role in determining child well-
being.” (1994, p.11, emphasis in original)
While a true social experiment is obviously not possible, “quasi-experimental”
methods are feasible. This approach, which is long-established in psychology and has gained a
certain currency in the economics literature, is described and reviewed by Meyer (1995). A
quasi-experiment involves the identification of exogenous changes in explanatory variables
that influence comparable groups in different ways, usually as the result of changes in
legislation. I examine the impact of parental divorce on the adult attainments of adolescents by
adopting this methodology. The methods and data employed are outlined in the first two
sections of the paper. Two quasi-experiments are described. They both involve the use of
multiple treatment groups. The outcomes of those experiencing parental loss through both
divorce and death are compared with the outcomes of those from intact families. Parental loss
through death is assumed to be less correlated with unobserved attributes of family
background than parental loss through divorce. As a result the group of individuals from
bereaved families represent a benchmark from which to judge the endogeneity of divorce. The
second quasi-experiment relies on legislative changes to the Canadian Divorce Act that came
into law during 1986, and uses multiple treatment groups in a before and after design. These
changes, which eliminated the need to prove fault as grounds for divorce, were intended to
make divorce a less adversarial experience and to reduce the stress to which children were
exposed. As such they offer exogenous variation in unobservable variables associated with the
quality of the time investments parents make in children. I argue that these quasi-experiments3
permit a more accurate estimate of the true effect of divorce on the attainments of children.
The results using difference-in-differences estimators and Canadian administrative data are
presented in section 3.
Amato (1993) among others notes the importance of comparing the experiences of
children with a bereaved background to those with a divorced background. However, many of
the studies attempting comparisons of this sort are limited in their relevance because of small
sample sizes, usually less than 100 children. A couple of exceptions include Fronstin,
Greenberg, and Robbins (1999) and Lang and Zagorsky (1999). However, while Fronstin et
al. do incorporate information on those from bereaved families they do not explicitly view
these individuals as offering the basis for an assessment of the endogeneity of divorce. Lang
and Zagorsky focus on this issue, treating parental death as an instrumental variable for
parental loss. Their paper is closest in spirit to my research.
One of the contributions of my paper is to use administrative data from income tax
records that offer much larger sample sizes—measured in the thousands—to address this
issue. The findings suggest that raw differences between children from divorced families and
those from intact families significantly overstate the detrimental impact of divorce across a
wide range of outcomes, and in particular that it is important to control for parental labour
market behaviour and income in the years before a divorce takes place. In general, the impact
of parental divorce on the adult labour market outcomes of adolescents is limited, but it does
have important consequences for some aspects of social behaviour. Specifically, it is found
that parental divorce lowers the adult incomes and earnings of sons, but on average only by
about three percent. The incomes and earnings of daughters do not seem to be influenced. In
contrast both men and women have a greater tendency to rely upon social programs,
specifically Income Assistance. But this probably goes hand in hand with the finding that the4
most significant consequence of parental divorce is to raise the probability that children will in
turn experience marital instability. Men and women from divorced families are more likely to
put off marriage, and once married more likely to experience separation and divorce.
1.  Methods
I examine a host of outcomes for a group of young adolescents—dealing with labour market
success,  reliance on social programs, as well as marital behaviour—and relate these to their
family background using a quasi-experimental framework with multiple treatment groups. The
analysis proceeds through three steps. First, an examination of differences and difference-in-
differences with multiple treatment groups; second, a similar examination but with controls for
background characteristics; and finally, an assessment of unobservables relying upon
legislative changes to the Divorce Act, and using difference-in-differences with a before-after
design.
Adolescents from both bereaved and divorced families are considered as treatment
groups, each group having experienced parental loss. If Yijk is an outcome measure of interest
for individual i, and if j and k indicate the family type (divorced and bereaved), then let
Yijk 
 = a + b1dij + b2dik + ei (1)
where all the variables are measured at the individual level, a, b1, b2  are coefficients to be
estimated, and where dij and dik are binary variables taking the value of 1 if the individual was
from respectively a divorced or a bereaved family, and a value of 0 otherwise. The difference
in the average outcome between those children whose parents divorced and those whose
families stayed together is ( 10 Y –  00 Y ) = (a + b1) – a, or just b1. Similarly the differences
between individuals from bereaved and intact families is ( 01 Y  –  00 Y ) = b2.5
The objective of the analysis is to obtain an accurate estimate of b1 for each of the
outcomes under study. However, if dij is correlated with ei then the estimate of b1 from the
simple framework of equation (1) will be biased. This is likely to be so. Children with
disadvantaged backgrounds are likely to have inferior adult outcomes. However, they are
probably more likely to also have parents who divorced, so that the estimate of b1 will
overstate the true value. At the same time, however, it is also likely that parental loss because
of death is not as correlated with these omitted characteristics implying that b2 is unbiased, or
at least less biased. The estimate of this coefficient is taken as a benchmark from which to
judge the extent of the bias in b1. Indeed, in the extreme I assume that dik is not correlated with
ei at all, implying that  parental death is exogenous.
1
If both parental divorce and death are exogenous and occur randomly across the
population it might be expected that the detrimental effects of parental loss on the outcomes of
children would be the same regardless of the reason for the loss. In the case of perfectly
comparable control and treatment groups the difference in means between individuals from
both bereaved and divorced families and the group of children from intact families is an
appropriate estimator of the impact of the intervention. The difference-in-differences
estimator, ( 10 Y – 00 Y ) – ( 01 Y – 00 Y ) = b1 – b2, will control for any common differences between
on the one hand bereaved and divorced families, and on the other hand intact families. A
                                                
1 It can certainly be argued that death is not a completely exogenous event, and that some of the factors that
determine it may also play a role in determining the adult outcomes of children. To offer only one example,
education is correlated with activities such as smoking that may raise the probability of death (Millar 1996). At
the same time parental education and the occupational choice and earnings of children are also correlated.6
difference that is insignificantly different from zero might be taken as evidence that divorce,
like death, is an exogenous event, and its impact accurately represented by b1.
2
Alternatively, a difference-in-differences estimate that is not zero could indicate
several things. The first has to do with the possibility that children from bereaved families are
not completely comparable to those from divorced families. The incidence of these events may
not be random across the population. For example, individuals working in particular industries
and occupations, or generally those with lower incomes, face a greater risk of death. While it
may also be that divorce is more likely in certain situations than others, these may not be
exactly same. This possibility calls for the use of background variables to control for any
differences in the composition of the two groups so that
Yijk
 = a + b1dij + b2dik + bXi + ei (2)
is the appropriate model under the assumption that the vector of background variables, Xi,
have the same coefficients across all three groups. I therefore offer estimates of both model (1)
and (2). The impact of parental loss is determined by the extent to which b1 and b2 are
significantly different from zero. Further, a difference between them that is not statistically
significant from zero (either in model (1) or (2)) may be interpreted as evidence that divorce is
exogenous (or rather at least as exogenous as death), and its impact accurately given by the
estimate of b1.
However, b1 and b2
  could continue to differ despite the use of a set of controls for
two reasons: (1) the controls are not complete; (2) suffering bereavement and experiencing
parental divorce are not equivalent events. Considering the latter, McLanahan and Sandefur
                                                
2 In fact, this is a slight abuse of the “difference-in-differences” terminology. Simply put, the concern is with
testing the null hypothesis that b1–b2=0.7
(1994, p. 66) suggest that the death of a parent may not involve as many changes for children
as parental loss through separation or divorce. There may be less of a tendency for children
from bereaved families to have to deal with residential moves if widowed parents face less of
a drop in income than divorced parents. This may happen, for example, when life insurance is
more of a compensation for parental death than support payments are for parental divorce. It
may also be that the two types of loss unleash a different process depending upon the nature of
the outcome being examined. For example, parental divorce may change a child’s perception
of the value of marriage or the risks associated with it; something that need not be the case for
those experiencing the death of a parent.
3
This issue aside, b1 may continue to differ from b2 if parental divorce is correlated
with unmeasured attributes not captured by the vector of controls and that differ across the two
groups. More specifically, this may be a reflection of the non-money investments that parents
make in children. One interpretation, following Becker (1991), is to suggest that when a
marriage is breaking up the parents are less able to invest as much time in their children. As a
result, their children’s human capital will not be as developed and they will experience inferior
adult outcomes. A different, but essentially equivalent interpretation can be found in the
sociology literature. For example, Amato (1993) describes five different theoretical
perspectives and a host of associated testable hypotheses, but the most pertinent perspective
for present purposes is the “Interparental Conflict” model. This perspective stresses that
“conflict between parents prior to and during the dissolution process is responsible for the
                                                
3 Alternatively, it may also be that the stress associated with experiencing the death of a parent has long-term
consequences for some adolescents. As Lang and Zagorsky (1999, p.10) point out, if this is the case it may be
that parental loss does not have a long-term impact on children, even if parental death is associated with inferior
outcomes relative to a comparable group from intact families and even if as a result the impact is similar to the
impact of divorce.8
lowered well-being of children of divorce.” (Amato 1993, p.30) As such it is not divorce per
se that determines the outcomes of children, but the stress and conflict associated with an
unhappy home life. Children may be drawn into the conflict between parents, and may not as a
result learn the skills needed for the appropriate resolution of differences and building of
relationships. This would appear to be another way of saying that the quantity and quality of
the time parents invest in their children is what matters. Assuming that parental death does not
involve conflict,
4 it may be hypothesised that there will be differences between children from
divorced and bereaved families who on average lived with both biological parents for the same
time, with the former faring worse.
5
A complete list of controls that includes direct measures of the amount of parental
time investments or of the stress children have experienced is rarely available to analysts, but
some variables introduced to control for compositional differences between the groups may
nonetheless be capturing a part of the underlying process. Parental income levels and
fluctuations in parental incomes are important correlates of the income and earnings prospects
of children, but at the same time it is easy to imagine that they may also be related to the
amount of stress the family faces and also the probability of divorce. For example, in
                                                
4 In Canada the annual rate of spousal homicide is about 11 wives and 3 husbands per million couples. This
includes legally married, common-law, and separated relationships. The rate declines with age. See  Statistics
Canada (1999. pp.35-6).
5 Amato (1993) also describes a “Parental Loss” model in which it is assumed that a two-parent family is
generally a better environment for children as each parent represents an important resource, contributing in their
own way to the family’s social capital. The presence of two adults offers not only greater practical and emotional
support, but also the development of a full range of role models from which to learn social and labour market
skills. The absence of a parent diminishes the children’s socialization, as well as access to resources and networks
that could be of value later in life. (In this sense children from divorced families may even do better than those
from bereaved families because they may retain some contact with their fathers.) What is emphasized in this
perspective is the absence of the parent, rather than the reason for the absence. Therefore, children who
experience parental divorce will have a lower level of well-being than their counterparts from intact families, but
a similar level to those from bereaved families. In one sense, this parental loss effect might be considered to be
what I am calling the “true” or unbiased effect of divorce, and is measured by b2.9
situations where the male has been the major provider for the family the loss of a secure job
followed by a period of long-term unemployment may trigger a chain of events that expose
children to more stress, and lead to divorce. In this case lower levels of incomes, and perhaps
just the change in income, represent important proxies for the kind of control variables called
for by the Interparental Conflict model. Even so it is unlikely that unobservables associated
with the quantity and quality of time investments made by parents in their children are
completely captured by these sorts of observable variables.
It is also possible to assess whether the set of controls available in my analysis are
complete—and therefore whether any remaining differences between the estimated values of
b1 and b2 from equation (2) should be viewed as substantive differences—by examining the
impact of some important changes to the Canadian Divorce Act introduced in 1986. In essence
these changes eliminated “fault” grounds for divorce. It was felt that the process associated
with establishing fault heightened the conflict between spouses rather than encouraging co-
operation, and that as a result it fell short of protecting the rights and interests of children. A
quasi-experiment designed around these changes permits exogenous variation in the amount of
stress faced by children of divorcing parents, and can be used to assess the robustness of any
differences between them and their counterparts with bereaved backgrounds.
The Divorce Act as it existed up to mid-1986 placed an emphasis on the fault of a
spouse for the marriage’s failure. It was also vague about the rights of children. There were
two grounds for divorce: fault, and marriage breakdown. A divorce could be granted on the
principle of fault if one spouse was found to have committed a “matrimonial offence.”
6 A
divorce based on these grounds could be granted as soon as the courts had time to deal with
                                                
6 These offences were defined in the legislation and included adultery, physical or mental cruelty, sodomy, and
bestiality.10
the case. In contrast divorces based on marital breakdown took much longer. A divorce on
these grounds required the spouses to be living apart from each other, the length of time
required before applying for a divorce varying from three to five years. (The notion of “fault”
continued to play a part in determining this.) Even when a couple decided to separate by
mutual consent, that is without any implication of fault, a separation of three years was
required before divorce could be granted. Describing the process the Minister of Justice stated:
If a spouse wants to avoid using fault grounds altogether, a separation period of three
to five years must be endured to “prove” that the marriage is beyond repair. In effect,
there is a penalty for not using fault grounds. The penalty is arbitrary and encourages
those considering divorce to fabricate fault grounds. Most divorce actions are
uncontested and involve some form of agreement between the spouses at the time of
the trial. In many cases, assertions of “fault” may be made simply to comply with the
law, which does not allow for a more straightforward divorce by consent. (1984, p.7,
emphasis in the original)
New legislation was needed because the tendency to fabricate fault grounds in order to obtain
a quicker divorce was putting the legitimacy of the law into question. As described in a 1984
discussion paper, under the new Act marriage breakdown would be the sole grounds for
divorce and “could be invoked when: a) both spouses assert that their marriage has broken
down and they agree to a divorce. In this case, a divorce would be granted one year after the
petition is made, or; b) either spouse applies for a divorce, and the spouses have been living
apart for one year before, or after, the application is filed.” (Minister of Justice 1984, p. 31)
The proposals would also drop the requirement of a formal trial, and allow out of court
procedures if the divorce was not contested. New legislation, however, was also needed to
clarify the rights of the children and base divorce cases on their interests. It was explicitly
argued that by removing the adversarial nature of divorce procedures the new law would
reduce the stress faced by children and help minimize the negative impact on their well-being.11
The circulation of these proposals had a significant short-term impact on the divorce
rate in Canada as couples who previously would have fabricated fault grounds postponed their
divorces to take place under the new Act. Figure 1 charts the divorce rate in Canada (per
100,000 legally married couples) from 1981 to 1995. Overall there is little trend in the data,
the rate in the first half of the 1990s being about the same as during the early 1980s. However,
the most notable development is the sharp increase in divorces between 1985 and 1987. The
number of divorces in 1985 was 61,976 (the lowest since 1979), but in 1987 it was 96,200, an
increase of more than 55%. This increase and the associated drop between 1984 and 1985 are
due to the anticipation of the new Act. The release of the white paper outlining the proposed
changes to the Divorce Act in 1984 was followed by the introduction of legislation to the
House of  Commons on May 1, 1985, which in turn received Royal Assent on February 13,
1986 and was proclaimed into law on June 1, 1986. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the
proposed changes were anticipated in advance, and led many couples to postpone initiating
divorce proceedings.
This postponement effect is the basis for a quasi-experiment used to control for the
stress to which children have been exposed. The couples postponing divorce proceedings in
1985 in anticipation of the new law were those who wanted a quick divorce, and who did not
have sufficient grounds to base divorce proceedings under the fault provisions of the old Act.
They are the couples who would have had a tendency to fabricate a fault ground for divorce.
Therefore the divorces that actually took place in 1985 might be considered to be on average
more stressful for the family than those in 1987. These would be the cases in which the
process either went on a lot longer, passed through the adversarial process engendered by the
old legislation, or cases in which there actually was fault as defined by the legislation.
Divorces granted in previous years also probably occurred with less stress since a larger12
proportion of divorces in 1983, just before the public discussion of the new law, were likely
based on fabricated fault grounds. Thus, it might be expected that on average children whose
parents divorced in 1987 experienced less stress than those whose parents divorced in 1985,
with those whose parents divorced in 1983 experiencing an intermediate level.
This suggests that the outcomes of children should vary according to the year of
parental divorce, and can be modelled in a before-after design with multiple treatment groups
as a series of interaction terms between an indicator for divorce and time. Adding indicators
for time to control for cohort effects, and an interaction term to model (2) yields:
Yijk = a + b1dij + b2dik + b3di,83
 + b4di,87
 +b5dij,83 + b6dij,87
 + b7dik,83
 + b8dik,87
+ bXi + ei
(3)
(The binary variables di,83 and di,87 take the value of 1 if the divorce or bereavement occurred
in 1983 or 1987 respectively, and zero otherwise; while the remaining binary variables are
interactions between these and the dij and dik indicators.) The coefficient of prime interest is
b6, which represents the difference-in-differences between divorced and married families:
( 87 , 10 Y –  85 , 10 Y ) – ( 87 , 00 Y –  85 , 00 Y ). If this coefficient is significantly different from zero the
suggestion is that those children whose parents divorced in 1987 have a different experience
than those whose parents divorced in 1985, relative to those from intact families. In a similar
vein, b5 captures the net effect of divorce for the 1983 cohort, while b7 and b8 measure the
difference-in-differences of coming from a bereaved family. If b6 is not statistically different
from zero then it might be reasonable to suggest that any differences observed between b1 and
b2 are substantive, and not due to the influence of this sort of unobserved influence. Parental
loss through divorce and through bereavement lead to different impacts upon children, and are13
not perfectly comparable. On the other hand, a statistically significant value of b6 might be
taken as evidence of the impact of unobservables associated with the stress to which children
are exposed. This would suggest that differences between the estimates of b1 and b2 are due to
an endogeneity bias resulting from unobserved stress and conflict associated with marital
break-ups.
2.  Data and Measurement
Administrative data associated with the Canadian income tax system, specifically with the T1
forms that Canadians are required to submit to the tax authorities each year, are the basis for
the analysis. The set of families in which the parents are married or separated and in which
there is at least one 16 to 19 year old child are identified in a particular year, T, where T is
either 1982, 1984, or 1986. At least one of the parents and one of the children must have filed
an income tax return in year T in order for the parent-child pair to be included in the analysis.
7
Further, the parents had to have considered themselves to be husband and wife (either married
or separated) for a five year period before year T. The children are divided into one of three
groups—one control group and two treatment groups—depending upon the transition the
family makes between T and T+1: intact families if the parents remained married
(representing the control group); bereaved families if one of the parents died in year T+1; and
divorced families if the parents became divorced. The analysis is based upon a total of
                                                
7 See Corak and Heisz (1999) for a more detailed description of the construction of the data, how the link
between parents and children is established, and an assessment of sample selection bias. With respect to the latter,
they point out that the requirement that children must file an income tax return while still living at home leads to
an under-representation of young adults with inferior labour market outcomes. However, they find that correcting
for this by using the two-stage correction for sample selection bias proposed by Heckman does not have
implications for their estimate of the degree of intergenerational income mobility.14
122,488 children: 108,966 from intact families; 7,336 from bereaved families; and 6,186 from
divorced families.
8, 9
The children are then followed through the tax files in each year from T to 1995—
when the youngest are 25 years of age and the oldest 32—and the outcome variables
measured. There are a total of eight of these, and they are described in the first panel of Table
1. The first set of outcomes is associated with the adult labour market position of the children:
average annual market income, average annual earnings, and a measure of labour market
activity. Income and earnings are averaged over 1993 to 1995. This is meant to represent the
permanent adult income/earnings of the child, the use of a three year average minimizing the
impact of transitory fluctuations. Market income includes earnings, self-employment income,
asset income, interest income, and other sources associated with the market. (All monetary
values are pre-tax figures measured in 1986 constant dollars.) On average the sons in the
sample have $20,559 of income and $18,621 in earnings, while the comparable figures for
                                                
8 The number of children from intact families is a one-in-ten random sample of the almost 1,010,000 individuals
actually falling into this group. This selection is made simply to ease the computational burden. The samples for
the other groups represent all of children who could be obtained from the T1 records in this way. While the
sample sizes for  the two treatment groups are much smaller than the control group, all of the samples are orders
of magnitude larger than those traditionally used in studies focused on these issues. See Amato (1993) who cites
a number of studies.
9 Given the construction of the sample, there is a possibility that the intact group is “contaminated” by some
children who experienced parental divorce or death after year T+1. To continue the metaphor from experimental
design, contamination of the control group will lead to an understatement of the impact of the treatment.
However, given the numbers involved it is unlikely that this bias is large. For example, borrowing from Bloom et
al. (1997), the true impact of the treatment, I
T, is given as I
T= I
O/(1-r), where I
O is the observed impact and r
represents the contamination rate. To develop a very rough sense of what the contamination rate might be
consider the possibility of classifying individuals into the control and treatment groups on the basis of whether
there was a divorce or death in the family by the time the child reached the age of twenty: that is, of following 16
year olds to year T+4, 17 year olds to year T+3, and 18 year olds to T+2. Given that the sample consists of about
1,225,000 children of which 13,522—or about 1.1%—fall into the treatment groups, then each of the four age
groups contributes 0.275% to the proportion of the treatment group (assuming that each cohort is the same size
and subject to the same the rate of parental divorce and death). This implies that 0.825% of the control group will
experience bereavement or divorce in T+2, a further 0.55% in T+3, and a further 0.275% in T+4 as the 16 year
olds finally attain the age of 20. As such, slightly less than 20,000 members of the control group will go on to
experience the treatment. But the analysis is based on a one-in-ten sample, so about 2,000 individuals of 108,966
are misclassified. This implies a contamination rate of 2,000/(108,966) or about 1.8%, and suggests that the
observed impacts reported should be multiplied by 1.018 to obtain the true impact.15
daughters are $15,999 and $13,896. Labour market activity is measured as the number of
times an income tax return is filed between 1982 and 1995. On average both men and women
filed in almost 12 of the 14 years, with a standard deviation of about 2 years.
The second set of outcomes has to do with the use of social programs:
Unemployment Insurance and Income Assistance (sometimes referred to as Social Assistance
or Welfare). If there is any receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits between 1993 and
1995 the individual is considered to have experienced a spell of insured unemployment.
10
About 35% of men and 44% of women collected some benefits. Similarly, if there is receipt of
Income Assistance between 1993 and 1995 the individual is considered to have relied on this
program, regardless of the amount of money received. About ten percent of men and eight
percent of women used Income Assistance.
The third set of outcomes has to do with marital behaviour. All of the T1 records of
the children between 1983 and 1995 are examined to determine if the individual was ever
married, ever separated, and ever divorced. Marital status is reported directly on the T1 form.
About 48% of the sons and about 62% of daughters had claimed at one point to have been
married. In Table 1 the incidences of separation and divorce—at 7.1% and about 3% for men,
and 10% and about 5% for women—are expressed unconditionally. Conditional on having
reported being married these figures are respectively 12.0% and 5.6% for men, and 14.3% and
7.1% for women.
11
                                                
10 Not all periods of unemployment are compensated with the result that this measure likely understates the true
incidence of unemployment. In particular, this will be the case with any unemployment associated with school
leaving.
11 An earlier draft of this paper also reports results for two additional outcomes: evidence of higher education,
and child-bearing while young. However, both of these variables reflect not only behavioural choices but also
tax-filing behaviour. The first is based on the use of an education or tuition deduction, while the latter is based on
whether a child tax exemption was claimed at any time up to and including 21 years of age. In both cases it is16
As a rough check of the representativeness of these data I offer in Table 2 a
comparison with survey based estimates of similar concepts. The averages derived from the
administrative data are based upon weighted data, those from intact families being assigned a
weight of ten. This implies that the results may differ slightly from those presented in Table 1,
but that they can be compared to surveys representative of the entire population of 25 to 32
year olds. The survey based labour market outcomes are measured from the Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (a longitudinal labour market survey) using the years 1993 through
1995, while the marital history outcomes are retrospective data derived from the General
Social Survey conducted in 1995. Both surveys are based upon stratified random samples
representative of the non-institutionalized Canadian population. However the estimates are
subject to sampling error. The average annual market income and earnings of men in 1995 are
$19,300 and $18,200, slightly below, but nonetheless similar, to the averages from the
administrative data. The comparable figures for women are $12,300 and $11,700. These are
somewhat lower than the tax-based estimates probably because those in the upper tail of the
income distribution are under-represented in the survey data. Underlying the averages
calculated from the administrative data are some very extreme values. Most notable is a
woman with a market income of over $19 million, reflecting a one year income of over $50
million. (See Table 1.) In contrast, the maximum earnings and income reported in the survey
data are about only $85,000. In this sense the administrative data may be more accurate than
the survey data.
12
                                                
likely that the incidence of higher education and child bearing at a young age is under-reported. These results are
available by consulting the working paper version at http://www.statcan.ca.
12 See Corak and Heisz (1999, pp.514-19) for an elaboration of this point.17
The two sets of estimates pertaining to the receipt of Unemployment Insurance are
roughly the same, but the receipt of Income Assistance, particularly for women, tends to be
lower in the administrative data. The survey data suggests that between 1993 and 1995 about
15% of young men and 16% of women received some Income Assistance. The estimates from
the administrative data are substantially lower: about 10% for men, and 8% for women. There
are two possible explanations for this. First, the sampling error for these smaller proportions
may be higher, making the survey based estimates less reliable. Second, and more importantly,
this may be related to the reasons for reporting Income Assistance on the T1 form. This type
of income—which is not taxable— is reported only if individuals are applying for a rebate
associated with the Goods and Services Tax (a consumption tax). The rebate is based on total
family income, and Income Assistance benefits are used in determining qualification. As such
Income Assistance will be reported by those individuals who are both aware of the rebate and
apply for it. The rebate first became available, and hence Income Assistance first began
appearing on the T1, in 1992. As a result the take-up rate for the rebate may have been lower
in, say at least, 1993 than it would have been had the program been well-established, resulting
in an understatement of the incidence of Income Assistance in the tax based data.
Finally, the outcomes associated with marital history from the tax based data all
accord fairly well with the retrospective information from the survey data, especially if it is
kept in mind that the latter are based on rather small sample sizes: 811 men and 979 women.
The remaining variables described in Table 1 are the controls used in the estimation
of models like equations (2) and (3). These are organized into seven sets. The first set consists
simply of the indicator variables for coming from one of the treatment groups: a bereaved
family, and a divorced family. As discussed above in conjunction with Figure 1, these are18
mutually exclusive.
13 Six percent of children come from bereaved families and about five
percent from divorced families. It should be noted that these percentages are sample
proportions, not estimates of the death and divorce rates in the population. They are much
higher than the actual rates because, as mentioned, the intact group are a one-in-ten sample.
Further, the sample includes siblings, and therefore represents the proportion of children
experiencing parental divorce or death, not the proportion of marriages.
With this in mind the implied death and divorce rates are 0.665% and 0.561%
respectively. The death rate is slightly higher than the divorce rate for a number of reasons.
The analysis is focused on a group of individuals with relatively long marriages (and whose
children are at least in their teen years). These individuals are necessarily older (on average
almost 50 years old) and have been together longer than average, implying that the death rate
is higher than average while at the same time that the probability of divorce is lower. In fact,
these implied death and divorce rates correspond pretty closely to the actual rates for the
married population older than 45 years of age. The weighted average of the death rate for
1983, 1985, and 1987 for the married population 45 to 64 years of age is 0.629%; similarly the
divorce rate over these years is 0.570%, almost exactly the rate reported here.
14
                                                
13 The sample described in Table 1 makes no distinction between individuals from bereaved families because of
paternal death and individuals suffering the death of a mother. It might be argued that the treatment groups would
be more comparable if only individuals suffering a death of their father were used. The argument in favour of this
approach is strongest if divorce implies that full custody of the children is always granted to the mother, and that
divorce implies the complete loss of contact with the father. I am not in a position to document the extent to
which this is in fact so in the sample being used, but whether bereavement was due to paternal or maternal loss is
available and used to define a sample in which the children from bereaved families are those experiencing the
death of a father. A total of 2,016 individuals are lost as a result of this selection rule (1,132 sons and 884
daughters). The analysis in the following section was carried through using this more restrictive sample, but the
findings were not significantly different. These results and the descriptive statistics associated with these data are
available upon request.
14 These rates are calculated by the author using data from Statistics Canada (1983,1985,1990a,b), and CANSIM.19
The first set of controls beyond these treatment-control indicators are the child’s age
and age squared in 1995. These are used to control for life cycle differences in income,
earnings, and marital behaviour. The second set consists of the age and age squared of the
oldest parent in year T to control for life cycle differences in the probability of death and
divorce. The third and fourth set relate to parental income and regular participation in the
labour market: the average income earned by each of the father and the mother over the five
year period before the family transition is measured (that is, using the terminology of Figure 1,
years T-4 to T inclusive); and the number of times an income tax return was filed in these
years by the father and by the mother.
15 Parental income can be an important determinant of
the capacity of parents to invest in the human capital of children. Often this capacity is
phrased in terms of a model with perfect capital markets so that all that matters is the parents’
permanent income (Mulligan 1997, Solon 1997). But it is conceivable that many individuals
will be constrained in capital markets so that temporary fluctuations in income also matter
(Mayer  1997). The number of years in which a tax return was filed by each parent is a rough
approximation of the family having experienced significant changes in income over the
period. In addition, it may represent significant changes in the pattern of labour force
behaviour of both the father and the mother that on the one hand might be interpreted as role
model effects—when viewed for example as the consequences of having a working mother—
or as a measure of the amount of change and stress that the family is experiencing—as might
be the case if the main breadwinner is not able to remain consistently attached to the labour
                                                
15 The income variables are defined as total income over the five years divided by five, that is regardless of the
number of years an income tax return was filed. In addition, the incomes and reporting status of both parents are
used throughout the five year period notwithstanding the length of time the parents were separated. Of the 6,186
individuals from divorced families 1,866 or 30.2% came from families in which the parents were separated
throughout the five years previous to the divorce. About 13% came from families who were separated for each of
the remaining possibilities: separation of 0, 1, 2, 3,or 4 years.20
market. Either perspective is consistent with this also being a measure of the quantity and
quality of time that parents have to invest in their children. The next set of controls is the
industry of employment of each parent in the year before the transition is measured (1982,
1984, or 1986). The major reason for using these variables is to control for the fact that the
probability of death may be correlated with industry of employment. Those working in
construction and the primary industries face a greater risk of on-the-job mortality than
average, while those in the service sector face a lower risk.
16 The final set of controls are
indicators for the region of residence since labour market conditions and some aspects of
divorce and family law vary between provinces. (Except for the larger provinces—Ontario and
Quebec—these are simply provincial indicators.)
3.  Results
a) Difference-in-Differences
The estimates associated with model (1) are presented in Table 3 for both men and
women. These are simply the mean values of the variables of interest (presented in columns
(1), (2), and (3)), differences in these means (columns (4) and (5)), and the difference-in-
differences between the two treatment groups (in columns (6)). For example, the results
suggest that the average annual income of men from intact families is $20,769, while the
income of their counterparts in bereaved and divorced families is lower at respectively
$19,790 and $17,721. Similarly, women from intact, bereaved, and divorced backgrounds
                                                
16 These variables are not, however, simply industry dummy variables because some parents worked in more than
one job and hence possibly in more than one industry during the year. In cases where the parent held two or more
jobs in different industries each of  the relevant industry indicators are used but weighted by the fraction of total
earnings obtained in that industry. As such these variables are defined only for individuals reporting a positive
amount of earnings: the self-employed and those not active in the labour market are assigned a value of zero for
each indicator.21
obtain on average $16,148, $15,363, and $14,185 in annual income. In general the findings in
columns (4) and (5) imply that parental loss leads to inferior outcomes. With respect to the
labour market outcomes, the incomes, earnings, and labour market activity of all groups
experiencing parental loss are lower than those from intact families. The exceptions to this are
the earnings and activity of women from bereaved families.
17 In fact, men from divorced
families obtain about 14% less income than those from intact families and earn about 12%
less. The comparable figures for women are lower but, at –12% and –9%, still substantial.
These patterns are mirrored in the rate at which income tax returns are filed: men from both
treatment groups have a lower rate of filing, but particularly those with divorced backgrounds.
Only women whose parents divorced have a lower rate of filing. The results dealing with the
incidence of insured unemployment are more mixed, with only men from divorced families
showing a greater prevalence to have received UI benefits than those from intact families.
Both treatment groups regardless of gender display greater reliance on Income Assistance.
Finally, parental loss in general seems to be associated with a lower likelihood of marriage,
and greater marital instability (conditional on having been married).
This being said it is also clear from the difference-in-differences presented in
columns (6) of the table that on average individuals from divorced families fare worse than
those from bereaved families. Incomes and earnings are more than $1,000 lower, and as much
as $2,000 lower in the case of the incomes of men. A similar result applies for all of the other
outcomes. Men whose parents divorced are 3.6% more likely to rely on Income Assistance
                                                
17 This might also quite reasonably apply to the incomes of women from bereaved families. While the p-value for
the t-test is less than 5%, that associated with the Wilcoxon test is almost 11%. The latter test is a distribution free
test robust to outliers. As such it may be the more appropriate test for judging the statistical differences in
incomes and earnings, particularly in the case of the incomes of women given the extreme data point discussed
earlier in conjunction with Table 1.22
than those who lost a parent through death; women in similar circumstances are 4.2% more
likely. Even more significantly, the probability of having married is about 7%  lower for both
men and women whose parents’ divorced than it is for those from bereaved backgrounds.
Likewise the conditional probabilities of separation and divorce are also higher. And, at least
in the case of women, there is no significant difference in the probability of separation or
divorce conditional on marriage between the intact and bereaved groups, while those from the
divorced group are more likely to experience marital instability.
b) Difference-in-Differences with Controls
The robustness of these findings to the inclusion of controls for background
characteristics is examined in Table 4. Different estimation techniques are used according to
the nature of the dependent variable. For each of the eight outcomes the table reports the
coefficient estimates associated with being in the treatment groups, and the p-value for a test
of equality between them. Seven models are estimated for each gender and outcome. A
successively larger set of controls is included as one moves from column (1) of the table
through to column (7). The last panel of the table indicates the other variables included in each
of the models.
The results in columns (1) of Panels 1 and 2—for income and earnings respectively—
repeat the findings given in the first two panels of Table 3: parental divorce is associated with
significantly lower child incomes and earnings, and the effect is statistically different from that
for the bereaved group. However, in general these differences are much diminished or
eliminated entirely by the use of additional controls. With the full set of background variables
there is no difference between the divorced and bereaved group, and a negative effect of
parental divorce is revealed only in the incomes, and possibly the earnings, of men. In this23
case parental loss, regardless of reason, implies on average an income of about $620 to $640
lower, which amounts to only about three percent.
In the case of women, the addition of child and parent ages are the only other
background variables required to eliminate the divorced-bereaved differences in incomes and
earnings. This happens in the models for men once parental labour market activity and
parental incomes are included. The full regression results reveal that a decrease in father’s
labour market activity of one year is associated with about a $750 decrease in the son’s adult
income and earnings. Conversely decreases in the mother’s activity by one year may actually
increase adult income and earnings by about a small amount ($100 or less). For daughters
these variables, including parental income levels, are not statistically significant, but once they
are included the bereaved and divorced coefficients become statistically insignificant from
zero.
18 The results associated with labour market activity echo these conclusions. These are
presented in panel 3 as the relative incidence rates from a Poisson model.
19 Men suffering
parental loss tend to be slightly less active in the labour market, women display no difference
across familial types.
There does not seem to be any statistically different pattern in the incidence of
insured unemployment between people from intact, bereaved, or divorced families, but a
difference in reliance on Income Assistance persists regardless of the set of controls included:
those of both genders experiencing parental loss being more likely to rely on the program by
about the same degree. In this case, the logit coefficient of the divorced group falls by about
                                                
18 The estimations in panels 1 and 2 were also performed using median regressions, which are robust to outliers,
and using both the full sample and a subset that excludes those experiencing maternal deaths. The results led to
essentially the same conclusions.
19 The estimation controls for the number of years that individuals could have filed a tax return: either the number
of years since they turned 16, or the number of years observed if the individual was older than 16 in the first year
of observation (that is year T).24
two-thirds and becomes statistically indistinguishable from the bereaved coefficient once
parental income is controlled. It seems to be about 0.2 for both men and women. To put this in
perspective a coefficient of this magnitude would raise the probability of a male receiving
Income Assistance by about 1.5 percentage points for a reference case defined around the
mean parental income levels (from 7.1 to about 8.6%).
20
The results associated with the remaining outcomes, dealing with marital behaviour,
are different. Those in the divorced group are much less likely to have claimed to have been
married at some point, while the members of the bereaved group are no different than those
from intact families. This pattern also holds with regard to the conditional probability of
separation and divorce: given marriage, individuals from a divorced background are more
likely to separate or divorce and the introduction of control variables does not alter this effect
very much. The magnitude of the effect of parental divorce on the child’s probability of
marriage is significant. For example, the estimated probability that a son with reference case
characteristics will marry is about 50%, but about 43% for someone from a divorced family.
21
c) Difference-in-Differences in a Before and After Design
An assessment of whether unobservables associated with parental conflict might
influence these results is offered by implementing the before-after design described by
equation (3). Table 5 offers a summary of the estimation results obtained from this model for
each of the eight outcomes. The p-values associated with t-tests of significance of the
                                                
20 The reference case also assumes that the child is 29 in 1995, the eldest parent 49 in year T, and that both
parents filed income tax returns for each of the five years prior to the transition year (T+1). (These are the modal
values.)
21  I also estimated Cox proportional hazard models of the age at first marriage, treating individuals who had not
married by 1995 as censored. These models confirm the logit results. Once parental age was controlled for the
baseline hazard between bereaved and intact individuals was not statistically different. However, individuals25
interaction term for divorce in 1987, b6  of equation (3), are presented for the simplest model
with no controls and for the model with the full set of controls (that is models (1) and (7) in
Table 3).
22 Results from a pooled sample of both men and women is also offered, but the
larger sample size does not lead to more precise estimates. The general impression is that the
impact of parental divorce after the introduction of the new legislation is no different than just
before. The major exception to this finding concerns the separation experience of women.
Regardless of the set of background variables included women are less likely to have
experienced a separation (conditional on having claimed to be married) if their parents
divorced in 1987 than if they had divorced in 1985. In fact this also holds for women whose
parents divorced in 1983, before the public discussion of the legislative changes, but the
former effect is stronger. (In the full model the logit coefficients are –0.403 and –0.342 for
respectively the 1987 and 1983 interaction terms.) Furthermore, the hypothesis that b6-b7=0 ,
that the 1987 interaction terms associated with divorce and bereavement are the same, can be
rejected with a p-value of 9.1%.
23 Too much should not, perhaps, be made of this one finding
because the chances women will divorce are not influenced by the timing of their parents’
divorce. It should be underscored that the indicators for divorce and bereavement continue to
display the same patterns revealed in Table 3 for all of the models. It is whether this familial
transition occurred before or after the legislative changes that makes in general no difference.
                                                
from divorced backgrounds always had much lower hazard ratios: more than 20% lower in model (1) and about
16 to 18% lower in model (7).
22 The estimation was performed using all of the  specifications presented in Table 3. The choice of models
makes no difference to the conclusions. The full results are available upon request.
23 The interaction term associated with the incidence of UI receipt is also significant for women across all the
models estimated. However, its sign runs counter to what would be expected: women whose parents divorced in
1987 are more likely to receive UI as adults than their counterparts whose parents divorced in 1985.26
4. Conclusion
The objective of the research summarized in this paper is to estimate the “true” impact of
divorce on the capacity of children to become self-reliant adults. The approach adopted
attempts to isolate the causal role of divorce by using a quasi-experimental design with
multiple treatment groups, and is based upon the assumption that parental loss through death is
more exogenous than parental divorce. The adult labour market outcomes, use of income
transfer programs, and marital behaviour of adolescents from intact, bereaved, and divorced
families are examined. The outcomes associated with individuals from bereaved backgrounds
is taken to represent the impact of parental loss, and any difference relative to those from
divorced backgrounds represents the consequences of an endogeneity bias.
An examination of raw differences between these groups and between them and
individuals from intact families implies that parental loss leads to inferior outcomes across a
wide range of economic and social measures. It also implies that coming from a divorced
family is even more detrimental than from a bereaved background. However, comparisons of
this sort overstate the impact of divorce. Difference-in-differences methods with controls
imply that taking parental income and attachment to the labour market into account eliminates
differences between those from divorced and bereaved backgrounds for a host of labour
market outcomes. In many cases the difference between these groups and individuals from
intact families is also eliminated. That is to say it would appear that with respect to labour
market outcomes the causal impact of divorce is relatively mild or insignificant. The incomes
and earnings of men suffer mildly—by about three percent—but incomes and earnings of
women are the same regardless of familial background. However, individuals with bereaved
and divorced family backgrounds are more likely to rely on Income Assistance (though not on
Unemployment Insurance).27
The major consequences of parental divorce are on the social behaviour, namely the
marital behaviour, of children. As such the results are in accord with the findings by Lang and
Zagorsky (1999) with U.S. data, LeBourdais and Marcil-Gratton (1998) with Canadian data,
and Kiernan (1997) with British data. Parental divorce has a significant negative effect on the
likelihood that children will marry. Not only do children whose parents divorced put off
marriage relative to children from intact families, but once married they are more likely to
suffer separation or divorce. Children from bereaved families, on the other hand, are no
different in their marital behaviour than those from intact families. It is reasonable to suggest
that at least for this set of outcomes experiencing parental loss through divorce and through
bereavement are not the same thing. In particular, attitudes to familial life and the importance
of marriage may not be changed by the loss of a parent through death, while witnessing the
divorce of one’s parents may lead children to think of marriage as a much more riskier living
arrangement. It is not likely that these bereaved-divorced differences reflect the influence of
unobservables, notably the exposure to stress and conflict to which children of divorcing
parents may be exposed. An analysis of children whose parents experienced divorce before
and after a liberalization of the Canadian Divorce Law designed to reduce the adversarial
nature of divorce suggests that it did not influence the chances that children will experience
marital instability in their turn. Since the quantity and quality of parental time investments in
children is expected to be superior under the new regime this suggests that the results are not
influenced by unobservables of this kind.
Even so, to understand the long-term implications of divorce it is important to
appreciate developments in the family before the divorce actually takes place. Parental income
and labour market behaviour are the crucial background variables that need to be controlled
for, and they might in part be interpreted as proxies for the stress the family may be under and28
the quantity of time parents invest in children. But if this is so, the results suggest that it is not
divorce per se that is important in determining the outcomes of children, but rather the quality
of the human and social capital available to them in their formative years.
There are a number of caveats associated with the analysis. First, the focus is on the
effect of divorce on teenagers, not on young children. It may be that the impact of parental
loss, especially with respect to cognitive development, may be greater for children at younger
ages. Nevertheless, the teen years are an important period in which human capital and marital
decisions are being made. Second, it may be that the impact of divorce has non linear patterns
affecting individuals at different points in the income distribution differently. The analysis has
focused almost exclusively on average effects. It might be reasonable to suggest that the
impact of parental loss is greater on children from lower income families since these families
will have fewer resources available to compensate for the loss of a parent. These remain
avenues for future research.29
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Figure 1
DIVORCE RATE IN CANADA: 1981 TO 1995
(Rate per 100,000 Legally Married Couples)































































Market Income (‘000s $) 20.559 16.191 -79.654 451.598 15.999 85.549 -24.488 19,432.380
Earnings (‘000s $) 18.621 15.112 0 504.241 13.896 11.149 0 163.495
Labour Market Activity (years) 11.614 2.217 1 14 11.816 2.006 1 14
Unemployment Insurance 0.354 0 1 0.442 0 1
Income Assistance 0.102 0 1 0.084 0 1
Ever Married 0.475 0 1 0.620 0 1
Ever Separated 0.071 0 1 0.101 0 1
Ever Divorced 0.030 0 1 0.048 0 1
FAMILY BACKGROUND
Bereaved 0.060 0 1 0.060 0 1
Divorced 0.050 0 1 0.052 0 1
OTHER CONTROLS
Child’s Age in 1995 (decades) 2.916 0.198 2.5 3.2 2.918 0.196 2.5 3.2
Child’s Age Squared 0.039 0.039 0.000 0.160 0.039 0.039 0.000 0.160
Parental Age (decades) 4.865 0.663 3.100 8.800 4.895 0.662 3.100 8.300
Parental Age Squared 0.440 0.646 0.000 15.210 0.438 0.657 0.000 11.560
Father’s Average Income (‘000s) 34.659 40.093 -101.234 4,646.872 35.778 43.927 -88.232 3,178.663
Mother’s Average Income (‘000s) 10.216 14.056 -43.458 1,079.372 10.904 12.914 -12.482 545.002
Father’s Labour Market Activity 4.666 1.162 0 5 4.651 1.196 0 5
Mother’s Labour Market Activity 4.228 1.699 0 5 4.270 1.654 0 5
Father’s Industry of Employment
Primary 0.037 0 1 0.034 0 1
Manufacturing 0.194 0 1 0.192 0 1
Construction 0.076 0 1 0.071 0 1
Transportation 0.083 0 1 0.084 0 1
Trade 0.114 0 1 0.115 0 1
Fire 0.060 0 1 0.063 0 1
Government 0.169 0 1 0.174 0 1
Services 0.043 0 1 0.042 0 1
Unclassified 0.001 0 1 0.001 0 1
Mother’s Industry of Employment
Primary 0.016 0 1 0.013 0 1
Manufacturing 0.066 0 1 0.068 0 1
Construction 0.013 0 1 0.012 0 1
Transportation 0.015 0 1 0.015 0 1
Trade 0.096 0 1 0.098 0 1
Fire 0.048 0 1 0.054 0 1
Government 0.139 0 1 0.140 0 1
Services 0.057 0 1 0.057 0 1








Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Newfoundland 0.025 0 1 0.020 0 1
Prince Edward Island 0.006 0 1 0.006 0 1
Nova Scotia 0.033 0 1 0.032 0 1
New Brunswick 0.030 0 1 0.030 0 1
Eastern Quebec 0.061 0 1 0.051 0 1
Montreal 0.063 0 1 0.069 0 1
Western Quebec 0.089 0 1 0.077 0 1
Eastern Ontario 0.054 0 1 0.058 0 1
Central Ontario 0.115 0 1 0.118 0 1
Toronto 0.080 0 1 0.090 0 1
Southern Ontario 0.085 0 1 0.084 0 1
Northern Ontario 0.033 0 1 0.034 0 1
Manitoba 0.045 0 1 0.047 0 1
Saskatchewan 0.044 0 1 0.037 0 1
Alberta 0.093 0 1 0.095 0 1
British Columbia 0.087 0 1 0.091 0 1
Yukon or Northwest Territories 0.057 0 1 0.060 0 1
Number of Observations 69,815 52,673
Source: Calculations by Author from Administrative Data
See text for variable definitions. All dollar figures are expressed in thousands of 1986 dollars using the CPI as the deflator.  Child’s age squared
and Parental Age Squared are based upon the deviations of age from the mean value.35
Table 2
A COMPARISON OF CHILD OUTCOMES FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AND SURVEY DATA
Men Women
Administrative Survey Administrative Survey
Average Market Income $ 20,746 $ 19,300 $ 16,131 $ 12,300
Average Earnings $ 18,776 $ 18,200 $ 13,958  $ 11,700
Unemployment Insurance 35.3 38.3 44.3 41.8
Income Assistance 9.7 14.7 8.0 16.1
Ever Married 48.0 44.6 62.5 60.5
Ever Separated 5.6 4.8 8.8 10.3
Ever Divorced 2.7 2.9 4.4 6.8
Note: Market Income and Earnings are expressed in 1986 dollars. All other data are estimates of population
proportions. Derivations from the administrative data rely on the samples described in Table 1, but with
individuals from intact families being assigned a weight of 10. The survey based estimates for Market
Income, Earnings, Unemployment Insurance, and Income Assistance are derived by the author from the
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics using weighted data on about 2,300 men and a similar number of
women (those 25 to 32 years of age in 1995). The survey estimates for Ever Married, Ever Separated, or
Ever Divorced are estimates as of 1995 derived by the author from Cycle 10 of the General Social Survey
using weighted data on 811 men and 979 women 25 to 32 years of age.37
Table 3










Intact Bereaved Divorced (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (5)-(4) Intact Bereaved Divorced (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (5)-(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 INCOME
mean 20,769 19,790 17,721 -979 -3,048 -2,069 16,148 15,363 14,185 -785 -1,963 -1,177
standard deviation / error 16,234 16,953 14,067 271 248 367 90,662 11,992 13,012 470 488 678
p-value, t-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.000
p-value, Wilcoxon test 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.000
2 EARNINGS
mean 18,795 17,720 16,575 -1,075 -2,220 -1,145 13,967 13,813 12,771 -153 -1,196 -1,042
standard deviation / error 15,180 15,148 13,597 242 239 340 11,166 10,802 11,204 199 221 297
p-value, t-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.000
p-value, Wilcoxon test 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.000
3 LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY
Mean Number of Years Taxes
Filed
9.46 9.39 8.91 -0.077 -0.550 -0.473 9.58 9.59 9.34 0.016 -0.240 -0.256
standard deviation / error 1.74 1.86 2.05 0.030 0.036 0.046 1.58 1.61 1.70 0.030 0.033 0.045
p-value, t-test 0.005 0.000 0.708 0.000
4U I
Proportion receiving 0.353 0.360 0.374 0.007 0.021 0.014 0.443 0.436 0.431 -0.007 -0.013 -0.005
p-value, proportions test 0.171 0.006 0.215 0.101
5 INCOME ASSISTANCE
Proportion receiving 0.097 0.128 0.164 0.032 0.068 0.036 0.079 0.099 0.141 0.020 0.062 0.042
p-value, proportions test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 EVER MARRIED
Proportion 0.481 0.463 0.398 -0.017 -0.083 -0.066 0.626 0.606 0.536 -0.020 -0.090 -0.070
p-value, proportions test 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.000
7 EVER SEPARATED*
Proportion 0.117 0.136 0.165 0.019 0.047 0.029 0.140 0.147 0.195 0.007 0.055 0.048
p-value, proportions test 0.008 0.000 0.205 0.00038
8 EVER DIVORCED*
Proportion 0.055 0.059 0.080 0.003 0.025 0.022 0.070 0.074 0.100 0.005 0.031 0.026
p-value, proportions test 0.278 0.000 0.217 0.000
Number of Observations 62,180 4,166 3,469 46,786 3,170 2,717
* Conditional on having claimed to be married. The number of observations for men are: intact – 29,886; bereaved – 1,930; divorced – 1,370. The number of observations for women
are: intact – 29,265; bereaved – 1,920; divorced – 1,455.
In columns (4) and (5) the p-values are for a one-sided alternative, in columns (6) they are for two sided alternative.39
Table 4
DIFFERENCE – IN – DIFFERENCES WITH CONTROLS
Child Outcomes Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. Adult Average Income (Least Squares Regression Coefficients) (Least Squares Regression Coefficients)
Bereaved -0.979 -1.312 -1.153 -0.846 -0.693 -0.641 -0.637 -0.785 -0.906 -0.855 2.981 1.980 1.768 1.594
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.095 0.067 0.018 0.299 0.312 0.308 0.314
Divorced -3.048 -2.963 -2.848 -1.703 -0.487 -0.453 -0.620 -1.963 -1.924 -1.384 7.344 -1.660 -1.927 -1.533
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.125 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.284 0.327 0.316 0.330
P-value for F test of Equality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.589 0.621 0.963 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.282 0.308 0.303 0.307
R-squared 0.002 0.026 0.026 0.059 0.060 0.063 0.067 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.074 0.075 0.077 0.078
2. Adult Average Earnings( L e a s t  S quares Regression Coefficients) (Least Squares Regression Coefficients)
Bereaved -1.075 -1.365 -1.109 -0.941 -0.766 -0.646 -0.607 -0.153 -0.224 -0.336 0.120 -0.083 -0.018 0.002
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.013 0.440 0.259 0.094 0.551 0.679 0.928 0.994
Divorced -2.220 -2.144 -2.154 -1.487 -0.061 0.014 -0.191 -1.196 -1.168 -0.663 -0.326 0.118 0.133 0.120
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.830 0.962 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.187 0.677 0.637 0.676
P-value for F test of Equality 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.111 0.052 0.068 0.250 0.000 0.001 0.268 0.500 0.546 0.648 0.724
R-squared 0.001 0.022 0.023 0.033 0.035 0.041 0.052 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.052
3. Number of Years Taxes were Filed (Poisson Regression – Relative Incidence Rates) (Poisson Regression – Relative Incidence Rates)
Bereaved 0.986 0.983 0.985 0.985 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997 1.000 1.001 1.000
P-value for t test 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.019 0.024 0.013 0.595 0.418 0.617 0.624 0.991 0.887 0.963
Divorced 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.982 0.983 0.979 0.979 0.978 0.976 0.976 0.997 0.998 0.994
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.726 0.780 0.419
P-value for Wald test of Equality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.373 0.236 0.015 0.022 0.007 0.007 0.773 0.747 0.476
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.00440
4. Probability of Receiving UI (Logit Coefficients) (Logit Coefficients)
Bereaved 0.032 0.050 0.065 -0.002 0.014 0.016 0.005 -0.030 -0.037 -0.009 -0.032 -0.016 -0.015 -0.031
P-value for t test 0.334 0.132 0.056 0.943 0.683 0.637 0.884 0.419 0.322 0.802 0.392 0.673 0.696 0.423
Divorced 0.092 0.088 0.028 -0.153 -0.002 0.004 -0.026 -0.052 -0.047 -0.087 -0.137 0.005 0.010 -0.011
P-value for t test 0.011 0.015 0.455 0.000 0.964 0.931 0.560 0.195 0.234 0.032 0.002 0.915 0.853 0.831
P-value for Wald test of Equality 0.212 0.427 0.444 0.003 0.765 0.817 0.566 0.680 0.839 0.152 0.062 0.726 0.691 0.757
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.038 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.013
5. Probability of Receiving Income Assistance (Logit Coefficients) (Logit Coefficients)
Bereaved 0.319 0.333 0.341 0.244 0.235 0.238 0.218 0.249 0.263 0.307 0.201 0.203 0.206 0.200
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
Divorced 0.607 0.605 0.504 0.224 0.147 0.152 0.119 0.649 0.646 0.505 0.185 0.193 0.210 0.213
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.015 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.010 0.011
P-value for Wald test of Equality 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.767 0.247 0.257 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.848 0.919 0.971 0.896
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.035 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.027 0.027 0.031 0.035
6. Probability of Ever having Married (Logit Coefficients) (Logit Coefficients)
Bereaved -0.070 -0.132 -0.059 -0.061 -0.042 -0.042 -0.036 -0.084 -0.122 -0.060 -0.064 -0.041 -0.041 -0.010
P-value for t test 0.030 0.000 0.079 0.070 0.215 0.211 0.298 0.026 0.001 0.124 0.100 0.302 0.296 0.803
Divorced -0.338 -0.340 -0.450 -0.461 -0.292 -0.293 -0.269 -0.371 -0.376 -0.487 -0.489 -0.292 -0.292 -0.239
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-value for Wald test of Equality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.035 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.057 0.001 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.051
7. Probability of Ever Having Separated* (Logit Coefficients) (Logit Coefficients)
Bereaved 0.168 0.145 0.185 0.158 0.164 0.165 0.159 0.057 0.047 0.089 0.083 0.081 0.091 0.094
P-value for t test 0.015 0.036 0.009 0.026 0.021 0.020 0.026 0.391 0.478 0.186 0.220 0.233 0.182 0.167
Divorced 0.395 0.389 0.261 0.170 0.224 0.228 0.207 0.396 0.396 0.295 0.274 0.232 0.249 0.293
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.035 0.019 0.017 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.006 0.002
P-value for Wald test of Equality 0.021 0.014 0.455 0.909 0.600 0.582 0.675 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.048 0.167 0.147 0.074
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.01341
8. Probability of Ever Having Divorced* (Logit Coefficients) (Logit Coefficients)
Bereaved 0.064 0.033 0.096 0.086 0.095 0.092 0.094 0.075 0.059 0.097 0.099 0.098 0.107 0.110
P-value for t test 0.522 0.740 0.345 0.400 0.350 0.369 0.358 0.407 0.511 0.292 0.279 0.288 0.246 0.234
Divorced 0.406 0.397 0.285 0.255 0.354 0.353 0.372 0.401 0.400 0.302 0.315 0.314 0.323 0.358
P-value for t test 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.003
P-value for Wald test of Equality 0.014 0.009 0.187 0.242 0.110 0.107 0.087 0.008 0.006 0.109 0.093 0.135 0.137 0.088
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018
Other Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Child’s Age and Age Squared YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Parental Age and Age Squared YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Father’s Average Income YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mother’s Average Income YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Years Father Filed YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Years Mother Filed YES YES YES YES YES YES
Father’s Industry of Employment YES YES YES YES
Mother’s Industry of Employment YES YES YES YES
Province and Region of Residence YES YES
Number of Observations = 69,815 Number of Observations = 52,673
All models include a constant term. Standard errors are calculated using heteroscedastic robust estimators of the variance-covariance matrix
* The models of the probability of ever having separated and ever having divorced are conditional on having married, and are based on sample sizes of 33,195 men and 32,640 women.42
Table 5
DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES IN A BEFORE – AFTER DESIGN WITH MULITPLE TREATMENT
GROUPS
Child Outcomes P-Value of t-test
Men Women Pooled Sample
1. No Controls – Model (1)
Market Income 0.914 0.406 0.491
Earnings 0.765 0.733 0.970
Labour Market Activity 0.543 0.441 0.382
Income Assistance 0.470 0.758 0.462
Unemployment Insurance 0.680 0.049 0.301
Ever Married 0.303 0.377 0.956
Ever Separated 0.572 0.037 0.254
Ever Divorced 0.895 0.499 0.579
2. Complete Controls – Model (7)
Market Income 0.870 0.195 0.424
Earnings 0.591 0.680 0.888
Labour Market Activity 0.459 0.468 0.338
Income Assistance 0.663 0.665 0.561
Unemployment Insurance 0.585 0.032 0.250
Ever Married 0.385 0.204 0.687
Ever Separated 0.593 0.040 0.278
Ever Divorced 0.930 0.497 0.619
Table entries are the p-vales associated with the t-test of the coefficient b6 of equation (3), described in the text.
See Table 4 for a statement of the estimation procedures used and a list of the other controls included in the
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